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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last thirty years of the twentieth century, the volume of direct
marketing received through the traditional channels of mail and telephone
increased rapidly. More recently, new electronic media for communications
have developed, such as fax, e-mail, and instant messaging, and new
personal communications devices have appeared, such as wireless phones
and e-mail devices, which have made communications easier, cheaper, and
more immediate. The growth of direct marketing in traditional and new
media has raised concerns about an important privacy issue, the right to not
be intruded upon or annoyed by unsolicited mail, telephone calls and
electronic messages (i.e., the "right to be let alone"). As a result there has
been a substantial increase in the demand for legislation to regulate direct
marketing in recent years. In the last two decades, legislation has been
passed by Congress and state legislatures to regulate direct marketing in
various media, including the establishment of do-not-contact lists for some
media (e.g., telemarketing), and the outright ban of unsolicited commercial
messages for other media (e.g., unsolicited commercial faxes).
Policymakers have had to balance the benefits derived from direct
marketing (and firms' free speech rights) with receivers' rights to privacy.
While direct marketing can improve the flow of information about products
available to consumers, and therefore provides a benefit to buyers, it also
generates a negative externality, since nonbuyers are also forced to expend
time, effort, and sometimes money processing advertising messages. A
large volume of poorly-targeted direct marketing messages can therefore
place a significant burden on consumers' time, patience, and resources.
Indeed, if the volume of advertising messages on a particular
communications medium is heavy enough, consumers may be deterred
from using that medium for their communications needs. Thus, direct
marketing can affect the usefulness, and even the viability, of a
communications medium.
1. See Daniel R. Shiman, The Nature and Causes of the Increase in Direct Mail
Volume in the Last Half of the Twentieth Century (Feb. 2001) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssm.conabstract=547042 (scroll down to SSRN Electronic Paper Collection and
download).
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This Article demonstrates how economic social welfare analysis can
provide guidance to policymakers who are considering whether to regulate
direct marketing in various media, and what forms of regulations are most
effective. The key factors that determine where the problem is likely to be
greatest are identified and analyzed to help determine in which media the
intrusion of direct marketing on receivers' privacy is likely to be the most
troublesome. The Article discusses how the recent rise in complaints about
direct marketing and demands for regulation is caused mostly by changes
in the technological environment, which have increased the volume of
direct marketing sent out and lowered direct marketing's value to
consumers, thus raising its total cost to receivers. Of particular importance
are the development of new inexpensive means of communication, such as
e-mail and electronic messaging, the use of mobile personal
communications devices, which increase the immediacy of
communications, and improvements in information technology, which
have lowered the cost and increased the profitability of conducting a mass
direct marketing campaign. The Article also discusses the various solutions
available, which can be deployed by receivers, senders, or imposed by the
government or the organization or firm that controls the communications
medium.
II. THE GROWTH OF DIRECT MARKETING
The use of direct marketing by advertisers has grown rapidly in the
last few decades. Much of this growth occurred in the traditional direct
marketing outlets, such as direct mail and telemarketing. In the late 1970s
and 1980s the volume of direct mail increased rapidly, as shown in Figure
1. Between 1975 and 1988 in particular, the number of direct mail pieces
received per capita jumped by 133%. 2 The likely causes of this increase are
the fall in information technology and communication costs, the general
increase in demand for advertising, and the increased information firms
have about consumers.3 In 2003, 54% of the total mail volume received by
households was direct mail advertising and fundraising, about thirteen
pieces per week per household.4 (See infra Figure 1.)
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 11-12.
4. See UNTED STATEs POSTAL SERVICE, THE HOUSEHOLD DIARY STuDY 3, 38 (2003),
available at http://www.usps.conhouseholddiary/.pdf/HDS2003.pdf. The 54% is derived by
dividing the total number of advertising by the total mail sent to households in 2003. See id. See
also UNrIED STATES PosTAL SERVICE, THE HOUSEHOLD DIARY STUDY 8, 38 (2004), available at
http://www.usps.com/householddiary/__pdf/HDS2004.pdf [hereinafter HOUSEHOLD DIARY
STUDY 2004].
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Telemarketing grew even more rapidly in this time period than direct
mail. Expenditures on outbound telemarketing increased annually by
10.3% from 1978 to 1996, versus 5.7% for direct mail. 5 By 1998, more
was being spent by marketers on outbound (from firms to consumers)
telemarketing, $58.9 billion, than on direct mail advertising, $39.7 billion.
Direct marketers have been quick to utilize new communications and
information technologies to help them advertise their products directly to
potential and existing customers. As fax machines became common in
commercial establishments, firms attempted to advertise their products by
sending unsolicited faxes.7 Advertising on the Internet has grown rapidly,
much of it in the form of Unsolicited Commercial Emails ("UCE" or
"spain"). It has been estimated that about 80% of all e-mail was spain in
2004. There has also been substantial posting of advertisements on
Internet forums and bulletin boards and on Usenet, Internet mailing lists,
10
and discussion groups." Some countries in Asia and Europe where Short
5. Annual growth rate calculated using natural logarithm, deflated by GDP price
deflator (e.g., if growth over T years from X0 to XT, growth rate =ln(XT/XO)IT). See
WHARTON ECON. FORECASTING, ECONOMIC IMPACT: U.S. DIRECT & INTERACTIVE
MARKETING TODAY 1997 (Direct Mktg. Ass'n 1997); DIRECT MAIL MKTG. ASS'N, FACT
BOOK ON DIRECT RESPONSE MARKETING 51-52 (1980); Data from Universal McCann U.S.
Advertising reports provided by Robert J. Coen, McCann-Erickson, N.Y. (August 2004)
[hereinafter Coen U.S. Advertising Report] (on file with Author and FCLJ). The GDP price
deflator is extracted from the U.S. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT tbl. B-3 (2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05
sheets/b3.xls.
6. Direct Marketing Flow Chart, DIRECT MKTG., Nov. 1999, at 3. Statistics on
telemarketing expenditures since the implementation of the FTC's Do-Not-Call list are not
available.
7. See Stop Me Before I Fax Again, ECONOMIST, May 27, 1989, at 29. See generally
Andrea Gerlin, Businesses Tired of Faxed Ads Sue the Senders, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1995,
at B I (detailing efforts of several companies trying to curb advertising rates).
8. Tom Zeller, Jr., Law Barring Junk E-Mail Allows a Flood Instead, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2005, at Al.
9. Usenet is a collection of special-interest discussion groups called newsgroups that
can be easily accessed on the Internet. Usenet newsgroups are set up like bulletin boards,
such that participants can post a message at no cost for others to read. See ROSALIND
RESNICK & DAVE TAYLOR, THE INTERNET BUSINESS GUIDE: RIDING THE INFORMATION
SUPERHGHWAY TO PROFIT 16-22 (1994); Wikipedia, Mailing List, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Mailing_list (last visited Mar. 29, 2006).
10. An Internet mailing list (often called a Listserv mailing group) allows members to
communicate with the group by sending in messages to a central list server, which then
distributes the messages by e-mail to subscribers. Many mailing lists allow anyone to easily
and freely subscribe and unsubscribe. See RESNICK & TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 9-16
(1994); Wikipedia, Mailing List, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mailing-list (last visited Mar.
29, 2006).
11. Julie Chao, Internet Pioneers Abandon World They Created, WALL ST. J., June 7,
1995, at B1. It has even reached the comment sections on bloggers' Web sites. See Matt
Hicks, Microsoft Bloggers Face Search Spam Pinch, EWEEK, Dec. 21, 2004,
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Message Service ("SMS") text messaging is heavily used have seen large
volumes of unsolicited advertising appear on text messages to mobile
devices. There are now predictions that commercial advertising will soon
appear on instant messaging ("spim"),' 3 IP telephony, 14 and telemarketing
calls to wireless phones. 
5
A. Public Reaction to Direct Marketing
The growth of unsolicited advertising in the traditional channels of
direct mail and telemarketing, and the new channels of advertising by fax,
e-mail, Internet forums, and electronic messaging, has attracted public
attention and concern. There has been an increase in the number of articles
on direct marketing in the news media, including newspaper editorials and
magazine cover stories. 16 Public opinion surveys suggest that the public is
quite concerned about the volume of direct marketing received. The
number of people who wish they received less advertising mail rose from
30% in 1987 to 49% in 1998 to 63% in 2003.17 In 1994, 86% of the public
said they wished they got fewer telemarketing calls. 18 Meanwhile 90% of
Internet users responding to a survey in November 2003 said they found
UCE annoying, and 74% wanted it banned. 19 Large numbers of Web sites
have been created to protest direct marketing, and organizations have been
http://www.eweek.com/print article2/O,2533,a=141476,00.asp.
12. DoCoMo in Japan reported that 84% of i-Mode traffic was sparn around 2002. John
L. Guerra, Wireless Spain: Coming to a Cell Phone Near You?, BILLING WORLD AND OSS
TODAY, Mar. 2004, available at http://www.billingworld.com/archive-detail.cfm?
archiveld=7454&hl#.
13. Celeste Biever, Spam Being Rapidly Outpaced by 'Spim,' NEWSCIENTIST.COM, Mar.
26, 2004, http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn4822.
14. This was called "spit" by one observer. Celeste Biever, Move Over Spain, Make
Way for "Spit," NEwSCIENTIST.COM, Sept. 24, 2004, http://www.newscientist.com/channelI
info-tech/electronic-threats/dn6445.
15. See Guerra, supra note 12; CBSNews.com, Telemarketers Eye Cell Phones, Dec.
17, 2004, http:llwww.cbsnews.constories/2004/12/17/eveningnewslconsumer/main
661811.shtml.
16. Joseph E. Phelps et al., Press Coverage and Public Perception of Direct Marketing
and Consumer Privacy, J. DIRECT MKTG., Spring 1994, at 9, 15-16 (1994). See, e.g., Revolt
of the Junk Receivers, ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 1990, at 24 (1990); Brad Edmondson, Death to
Junk Mail!, Am. DEMOGRAPHICS, Sept. 1992, at 2; Susan Headden, The Junk Mail Deluge,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 8, 1997, at 40-41.
17. See U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, THE HOUSEHOLD DIARY STUDY 111-29, tbl. 3-11 (1999)
[hereinafter HOUSEHOLD DIARY STUDY 1999]; HOUSEHOLD DIARY STUDY 2003, supra note
4, tbl. A4-10.
18. U.S. POSTAL SERVICE HOUSEHOLD DIARY STUDY (1994) (unpublished survey results
on file with the Author and the FCLJ).
19. HUMPHREY TAYLOR, THE HARRIS POLL, HARRIS INTERACTIVE, SPAM KEEPS ON
GROWING (2003), http://www.harisinteractive.com/harris-poll/index.asp?PID=424.
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set ug to encourage legislation that would regulate telemarketing and
spain.
Policymakers have responded by conducting hearings, passing
legislation, and implementing new rules, to regulate some forms of direct
marketing. 2 1 Yet some forms of direct marketing have received more
attention and legislation and are heavily regulated (or even banned), while
other forms have appeared to spark less concern and have been less
regulated. For example, despite the attention given in the media2 2 and in
congressional hearings, 23 direct mail has not been regulated, and there
appears to be little public pressure to regulate it in the near future.
24
Telemarketing, on the other hand, has been heavily regulated at the
state and federal levels, and the strength of the regulations is increasing.
25Initially, just the hours and methods of contact were regulated. More
recently, new legislation and regulations have made it easier for consumers
to completely opt-out of receiving unsolicited telemarketing calls. Many
states have passed "asterisk bills," which prohibit unsolicited telephone
20. Leslie Gomstein, Telemarketer-bashing Spreads Across Internet, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 3, 1997, at 1. For example, an organization dedicated to stopping the
use of UCE called the Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email ("CAUCE") claims
to have over 21,000 members as of early 2005, and is pressing Congress to pass legislation
restricting unsolicited e-mail. CAUCE Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email,
CAUCE Membership Statistics, http://www.cauce.org/members/stats/index.phtml (last
visited Mar. 18, 2006) [hereinafter CAUCE].
21. For example, Congress has conducted hearings on direct mail, and passed the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act to regulate telemarketing, and the CAN-SPAM Act of
2003 to regulate direct marketing on the Internet. Oversight Hearing on the Use of Mailing
Lists in Direct Marketing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Postal Operations and Serv. of
the H. Comm. on Post Office and Civil Serv., 102nd Cong. (1991) [hereinafter Oversight
Hearing]; ARTHUR WINSTON, DiREcT MARKETING AND THE LAW: WHAT MANAGERS NEED
TO KNOw 194-195 (1993); Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, The CAN-SPAM
Act: Requirements for Commercial Emailers, Apr. 2004.
22. See, e.g., Revolt of the Junk Receivers, supra note 16; Edmondson, supra note 16;
Headdon, supra note 16.
23. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 21.
24. There is some self-regulation in the form of a do-not-mail list called the Mail
Preference Service ("MPS"), which is maintained by the industry trade group the Direct
Marketing Association ("DMA"). See DIRECT MKTG. Ass'N, PRIVACY PROMISE MEMBER
COMPLIANCE GUIDE (2003), http://www.the-dma.org/privacy/Privacy-Promise.pdf
[hereinafter COMPLIANCE GUIDE].
25. Telemarketers were required to register with state authorities in many states, and
the large majority of states have regulated the use of Automatic Dialing Recorded Message
Players ("ADRMPs") and the permitted hours of making calls. Congress passed the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") in 1991, which restricted the hours of
calling, required that telemarketers maintain do-not-call lists, and prohibited the use of
ADRMPs. See WINSTON, supra note 21, at 186-87; DIRECT MKTG. ASS'N, COMPENDIUM OF
GOVERNMENT ISSUES AFFECTING DIRECT MARKETING IN 1998, 65-69 (Elizabeth Scanlon
ed., 1999) (on file with author and FCLI).
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sales calls to people who have requested that an asterisk be placed next to
their name in the telephone directory, or have required that telemarketers
honor do-not-call lists.26 The most significant impact has come from the
national Do Not Call registry imposed by the FTC in 2003. Sixty-two
million phone numbers were signed up just one year later, about 60% of
respondents to a survey.27
Commercial advertising both to fax machines and using text
messaging to mobile phones has been banned.28 Notably, both methods of
advertising cost the receivers money. There were significant complaints
about unsolicited fax messages in the 1980s, especially since faxes
consumed receivers' toner and paper, and tied up their fax machines.29
Unsolicited fax advertising was banned by the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991 ('TCPA").3 ° Meanwhile, phone companies in the
United States usually charge a per message fee for sending and receiving
text messages.3 1 The FCC prohibited the sending of unsolicited
commercial messages to mobile phones in 2004 as part of the
implementation of the CAN-SPAM act.
32
Telemarketing to wireless phones has become controversial, and it
too incurs a cost for receivers.3 3 While not illegal, it has been limited by a
combination of self-restraint by telemarketers following the rules issued by
the industry trade 4group, the Direct Marketing Association ("DMA"), and
legal restrictions. The FTC's Do Not Call registry accepts wireless phone
26. WINSTON, supra note 21, at 186-87; DIRECT MKTG. ASS'N, supra note 25. About
forty states have regulations concerning honoring do-not-call lists, and many of these
maintain their own list. See Direct Mktg. Ass'n, Where Marketers Can Obtain State Do-
Not-Call Lists, http://www.the-dma.org/government/donotcalllists.shtml (last visited Mar.
18, 2006).
27. Press Release, FTC, National Do Not Call Registry Celebrates One-Year
Anniversary (June 24, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/06/dncanny.htm. The FTC also
reported that 87% of those who signed up said they received fewer calls. Id.
28. WINSTON, supra note 21, at 194; Rules and Regsulations Implementing the
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Order,
19 F.C.C.R. 15927, paras. 1, 13-19 (2004) [hereinafter Non-Solicited Pornography].
29. See Stop Me Before I Fax Again, supra note 7; Gerlin, supra note 7; R.A. Spinello,
Ethical Reflections on the Problem of Spamn, 1 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 185, 187 (1999).
30. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227, 227(d) (2000);
WINSTON, supra note 21, at 194.
31. For example, Verizon Wireless charges $0.10 for each message sent or received
with packages available that allow unlimited text messages with other Verizon Wireless
customers for a monthly fee. See Verizon Wireless, Personal, Plans,
http://www.verizonwireless.com (select "Individual Plans"; click "TXT messaging") (last
visited Mar. 28, 2006).
32. Non-Solicited Pornography, supra note 28.
33. CBSNews.com, supra note 15.
34. See COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 24; Press Release, Direct Mktg. Ass'n,
Unsolicited Marketing Calls to Cell Phones Are Illegal-With or Without a Cell Phone
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numbers, and the TCPA's prohibition on the use of automatic telephone
dialing equipment, which the FCC now interprets to include the commonly
used predictive dialers, for calling wireless numbers significantly reduces
the incentive for telemarketers to call wireless phones.
3 5
The rapid growth of UCE (i.e., spam) has generated many complaints
from users and Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") (which incur added
costs from carrying it on their servers) and attracted policymakers'
attention. Many states have passed laws to regulate UCE, or are
considering legislation to restrict its use.36 Congress passed the CAN-
SPAM Act of 2003, which requires that commercial e-mail clearly
indicates who sent it and what its purpose is, and be labeled as advertising
in the subject line.37 The volume of spam e-mail has continued to rise since
passage, however.
38
B. The Literature on Direct Marketing
The evident rise in public concern about direct marketing has yet to
be fully explained in the formal literature. Kielbowicz 39 argues that the
controversy surrounding "junk mail" was manufactured by newspapers in
order to raise third class postal rates and hinder the development of direct
mail, a traditional competitor to newspapers for advertising. Yet the
strength of the public's reaction against direct marketing in media other
than mail suggests that the public has substantial concerns about the direct
marketing that it receives.
4 0
Some privacy experts have analyzed this issue as an encroachment on
individual privacy. Privacy experts have recognized that two kinds of
individual privacy are affected by direct marketing: the right to be left
alone, and the right to control information about oneself.4 1 Yet most of the
Directory (Dec. 10, 2004), http://www.the-dma.org/cgi/disppressrelease?article=609.
35. See Joseph Sanscrainte, Wireless Number Portability: The Compliance Conundrum,
CONNECTIONS MAG., June 2004, available at http://www.connectionsmagazine.com
articles/4/043.htm.
36. See CAUCE, supra note 20.
37. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE CAN-SPAM ACT: REQUIREMENTS FOR
COMMERCIAL EMAILERS (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/
canspam.pdf.
38. Zeller, supra note 8.
39. Richard B. Kielbowicz, Origins of the Junk-Mail Controversy: A Media Battle over
Advertising and Postal Policy, 5 J. POL'Y HIST. 248, 249 (1993).
40. See supra Part I.A (describing public reation).
41. See Ellen R. Foxman & Paula Kilcoyne, Information Technology, Marketing
Practice, and Consumer Privacy: Ethical Issues, 12 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 106, 107
(1993); Cathy Goodwin, Privacy: Recognition of a Consumer Right, J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG
149, 150 (1991); Mary Gardiner Jones, Privacy: A Significant Marketing Issue for the
1990s, J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG 133, 135 (1991).
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discussion on direct marketing's impact on privacy, in the academic
literature and the popular press, has concentrated on consumers' loss of
control over information about themselves, i.e. their loss of "informational
privacy. ' 42 However, the volume problem, which involves the "right to be
left alone," is fundamentally different from the informational privacy
problem. While informational privacy can easily be compromised by a
single incident of personal information being improperly obtained or
used,43 the volume problem as discussed here relates to the aggregate
volume of advertising received. Therefore, the key issues here are not
individual incidents and how to prevent them, but the basic conditions
determining the volume and relevance of advertising received by
consumers, and how burdensome this advertising is for consumers to
process. Thus, the volume problem must be studied differently, and the
solutions needed will differ in nature from those proposed to protect
informational privacy.
44
Much of the literature on the volume problem has tended to focus on
either the ethical45 or legal46 issues concerning direct marketing's impact
42. See, e.g., Paul N. Bloom, et al., Avoiding Misuse of New Information Technologies:
Legal and Societal Considerations, 58 J. MKT 98, 100 (1994); Jones, supra note 41; Kevin
F. McCrohan, Information Technology, Privacy, and the Public Good, 8 J. PUB. POL'Y &
MARKETING 265, 265-266 (1989); John Morse & Suzanne Morse, Teaching Temperance to
the 'Cookie Monster': Ethical Challenges to Data Mining and Direct Marketing, 107 Bus.
& Soc'Y REv. 76, 76 (2002); Glen J. Nowak & Joseph Phelps, Understanding Privacy
Concerns: An Assessment of Consumers' Information-Related Knowledge and Beliefs, J.
DIRECT MKTG., Autumn 1992, at 28; Glen J. Nowak & Joseph Phelps, Direct Marketing
and the Use of Individual-Level Consumer Information: Determining How and When
'Privacy' Matters, J. DIRECT MKTG, Summer 1995, at 46; Phelps et al., supra note 16, at
17-18 (noting that of 435 newspaper stories from five major newspapers that were
examined for 1984-1992, 71% contained references to the gathering and/or use of
information about consumers, while only 30% concerned the intrusion of uninvited
advertising messages).
43. Cf. Goodwin, supra note 41, at 150-52.
44. The volume problem does not encompass all possible violations of an individual's
right to be left alone. A single incident, such as a fraudulent telemarketing call or a
harassing call, can intrude on this other form of privacy. These potential violations of
individual privacy fall outside the scope of this Article.
45. See, e.g., Spinello, supra note 29; Foxman & Kilcoyne, supra note 41; George
Milne & Mary Ellen Gordon, Direct Mail Privacy-Efficiency Trade-offs Within an Implied
Social Contract Framework, 12 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 206 (1993).
46. See, e.g., Jonathan Byrne, Squeezing Spam Off the Net: Federal Regulation of
Unsolicited Commercial E-mail, 2 W. VA. J.L. & TEcH. 1.4 (1998),
http://www.wvu.edu/-law/wvjolt/Arch/Byrne/Byrne.htm; Michael W. Carroll, Garbage In:
Emerging Media and Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial Solicitations, 11 BERKELEY TECH.
L. J. 233 (1996), available at http://fringe.davesource.comFringe/NonZen-Companies/
Spammers/LegaAnalysis.html; Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech vs. Privacy: Is There a
Constitutional Right Not to be Spoken to?, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 153 (1972); David E. Sorkin,
Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 45 BUFF.
L. REv. 1001 (1997); WINSTON, supra note 21.
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on consumers' privacy. Some authors have proposed or discussed
particular solutions to the problem.47 The direct marketing trade press has
also discussed the issue, often providing advice to direct marketers on how
to avoid angering consumers or policymakers with their marketing.
48
There is recent economics literature that analyzes the issues of call
externalities 49 and information overload50 discussed in this Article. Some
of this literature focuses on pricing issues and on finding the welfare-
maximizing price that achieves the optimal level of message-sending.
5 1
However, there has been little attempt to provide an overarching
framework to be used by policymakers for analyzing the problem in many
communications media using a microeconomic perspective. Such a
framework would help us understand how serious the problem is, or is
likely to become, for different media, and how it is affected by various
economic and technological factors. It would also help policymakers better
evaluate the impact of various possible regulations that could be used to
reduce the problem where it exists.
This Article analyzes the volume problem generated by direct
marketing, using a theoretical framework that is based on microeconomic
social welfare analysis. This framework allows for a multichannel
approach to regulation, such that the decision to regulate direct marketing
in any particular media would take into consideration the opportunities for
firms to advertise their products using other, more suitable, media. This
approach complements traditional legal and ethical analysis. The problems
of informational privacy, consumer fraud, and free speech are not
considered here (except tangentially), since they fall outside the scope of
47. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77
(2003); Thede Loder, Marshall Van Alstyne & Rick Wash, An Economic Response to
Unsolicited Communication (2005), available at http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/
443/spam-tprc.pdf; Lorrie Faith Cranor & Brian A. LaMacchia, Spam!, COMM. ASS'N
COMPUTING MACHINERY, Aug. 1998, at 74; Goodwin, supra note 41; Milne & Gordon,
supra note 45; Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone Calls and the Right
of Privacy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 99 (1986).
48. See, e.g., Karl Dentino, Taking Privacy Into Our Own Hands, DIRECT MKTG., Sept.
1994, at 38; Phil Herring, Life Beyond the Spreadsheet, DIRECT MKTG., Feb. 1992, at 49;
Donna Loyle, Do's & Don'ts in the Privacy Era, TARGET MKTG., Nov. 2003, at 30.
49. Call externalities are the benefits gained by the recipient of a message sent by
someone else. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, Sender or Receiver: Who Should
Pay to Exchange an Electronic Message?, 35 RAND J. ECON. 423, 423 (2004).
50. See, e.g., Timothy Van Zandt, Information Overload in a Network of Targeted
Communication, 35 RAND J. ECON. 542 (2004).
51. See, e.g., Daniel R. Shiman, When E-Mail Becomes Junk Mail: The Welfare
Implications of the Advancement of Communications Technology, 11 REv. INDUS. ORG. 35
(1996); Hermalin & Katz, supra note 49; Loder, Van Alstyne & Wash, supra note 47.
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the framework presented. Those interested in these issues should consult
the extensive literature concerning them.
52
This Article next describes the basic framework for analysis, and
shows how the value of direct marketing can vary using a mathematical
model and some examples. It focuses in the initial analysis on two key
factors: the sending and receiving costs associated with a particular
communications medium. The following Part discusses how to apply the
framework to the various media available for direct marketing. It then
discusses how to take into consideration other factors that could affect the
value of direct marketing in particular media, and how these factors may
change over time. Next, the kinds of solutions that are available to reduce
the cost of direct marketing to consumers and society are examined. The
final Part provides some concluding remarks.
III. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF THE VOLUME
PROBLEM
This Article is concerned with the kind of direct marketing that
involves firms sending unsolicited advertising messages directly to
selected consumers. This advertising benefits consumers by informing
them about products they might want to buy. However, it also imposes a
cost on consumers, regardless of whether they buy the product. This cost
includes the time and effort used in processing the message (reading the
letter or answering the telephone and hearing the sales pitch), and
determining the appropriate response. For example, if a consumer receives
a letter from a marketer advertising encyclopedias, the consumer benefits
by hearing about the encyclopedias, but at a cost of having to open, read,
and dispose of the letter. If the consumer does not purchase the
encyclopedias, the time spent examining the letter will likely have been
wasted. While the cost of processing each message may be small, large
numbers of messages may impose a significant burden on consumers' time
and patience. With some kinds of messages (e.g., fax and SMS text
messages) there is also a financial cost incurred by the recipient for
receiving a message. Because there is a cost from these messages imposed
on receivers which is incurred regardless of whether a purchase is made,
this market for messages generates a negative externality. When negative
52. See, e.g., Bloom et al, supra note 42; Byrne, supra note 46; Carroll, supra note 46;
Foxman & Kilcoyne, supra note 41; Goodwin, supra note 41; Milne & Gordon, supra note
45; Morse & Morse, supra note 42; Sorkin, supra note 46.
53. The benefits a consumer might derive from reading about the product are discussed
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externalities exist, market mechanisms do not typically lead to efficient
results.
54
This Article utilizes microeconomic social welfare analysis in a
framework developed in a previous paper by the author.55 Social welfare
analysis is employed here to analyze the value (and potential harms) to
consumers and society of receiving advertising messages and to assess the
impact of various organizational, technological, and regulatory options that
could be implemented.56
A microeconomic approach usually requires the identification of the
benefits and costs of the market action, in this case the sending and
receiving of direct advertising messages. Firms use direct marketing to
attempt to sell their products directly to customers they have identified as
likely purchasers. 57 They will send an advertising message to every
consumer for whom the expected (i.e., average) revenue gained from
sending the message exceeds the cost of sending the message, such that the
firm earns a positive expected profit from sending the message. The
expected net benefit the consumer gets from a message equals the
difference between the expected benefit of hearing about the product and
the cost of processing the message. The expected net benefit to society (i.e.,
the welfare gained) from sending a message is then the expected net benefit
to the consumer of receiving the message, plus the net benefit to the firm of
54. Externalities occur when some of the costs or benefits from a market action are not
borne by the market participants. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 82 (3d ed. 2000). In market transactions without externalities,
those who incur costs associated with the transaction (usually by the producer of the good)
are compensated by payments (usually from buyers). In this case, there is a cost created by
the sending of a message (i.e., the cost of processing the message) that is imposed on third
parties, which are the people who receive and process the message but do not buy the good.
55. Shiman, supra note 51. Microeconomic social welfare analysis examines the costs
and benefits to society from the operation of a market. Markets that are operating efficiently
maximize the net benefits (called social welfare) society gains from that market. Social
welfare analysis is often used by economists to determine the extent of market failure in a
particular market, whether caused by structural characteristics of the industry, externalities,
or government regulations and taxes. They also use it to analyze the impact of a policy
action on a market. See generally CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 54, ch. 3.
56. Oftentimes social welfare analysis involves separately determining the impact of
the market and the market failure on consumers (called consumer surplus) and producers
(called producer surplus) to find each group's net benefit, and then summing the two
groups' net benefits to calculate the impact on welfare. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 54,
at 71-72. In this Article the analysis focuses on senders and receivers of messages. Note
that while message senders are usually sellers of a good, most recipients do not buy the
good, so the correspondence is not identical to the usual model of sellers and buyers of
goods.
57. According to one survey, the industries that use direct mail the most are mail order
firms, publishers, department stores, specialty stores, and credit card companies, in that
order. HOUSEHOLD DIARY STUDY 1999, supra note 17, at VI-7.
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sending it (i.e., the firm's profit). If firms send out messages which provide
a negative expected net benefit to society, then this Article will call these
messages "Welfare-Reducing Marketing" messages or WRM. Society
would be better off if WRM messages were not sent, since the cost to
consumers to receive and process these messages is greater than the
expected benefit to consumers from hearing about the product plus the
expected profit to firms from sending the message.
The expected benefit to the consumer of hearing about the product
depends on, among other factors, the likelihood that the consumer will
purchase the product. This in turn depends on how carefully the sending
firm has targeted likely buyers. Firms maintain or acquire lists of
consumers classified according to the consumers' personal characteristics
such as demographics, lifestyles, subscriptions, and past purchases. For
each offer of a particular product, price and sales pitch, firms are able to
test each list with sample mailings of 5,000-10,000 names to determine
that list's response rate, which is the proportion of people on the list that
respond to each mailing. Each list is used in a direct marketing campaign
only if it generates a high enough response rate to produce sufficient
revenue to at least cover the cost of the mailings to that list.
58
Low message sending costs make it profitable for a firm to send
advertising to lists with low response rates. In effect, the low cost of
contacting consumers reduces the incentive for marketers to target their
advertising carefully, because the cost of wasting advertising on nonbuyers
is low. The consumers receiving this advertising, however, may place a
low value on it, because of the low probability of their purchasing the
good. For example, if a firm uses lists with a 1% response rate, only 1 in
100 recipients will be interested, and the other recipients might consider
the mailing unwelcome, even before examining it.
59
58. See BOB STONE, SUCCESSFUL DIRECT MARKETING METHODS ch. 9 (5th ed. 1994).
For example, if a firm has three lists of potential customers, call them lists A, B, and C, then
the firm might try test mailings to three samples of 10,000 names, one sample drawn from
each list. If in response to the test mailing 100 people on list A, 500 people on list B, and
2,000 people on list C purchase the firm's good, then the predicted response rate for list A is
100/10,000 = 1%, for list B is 500/10,000 = 5%, and for list C is 2,000/10,000 = 20%. If the
firm determines that a 10% response rate is required for the mailing to be profitable, then
the firm would consider engaging in a full direct marketing campaign, with a mailing sent to
all names on the list, only for list C.
59. Note the expected benefit is determined ex ante, before the receiver has processed
the message and decided whether to respond. WRM can therefore occur for all consumers
who receive the message, even those who ex post find it useful. This would be akin to
forcing people to buy a $2 lottery ticket, with a 1% chance of winning $100, yielding an
expected net benefit of -$1. Even though there are a few happy winners in the short run, if
this purchase occurs repeatedly, everyone will likely be worse off in the long run.
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Thus an advertising message is more likely to be considered
undesirable by receivers if it is poorly targeted, and if the cost of
processing the message (both financial and in time and effort) is high.
Those media with low costs of sending messages, and that have a high cost
of receiving and processing messages are therefore more likely to have
welfare-reducing messages.
In some media the sending costs may be sufficiently low, and
receiving costs sufficiently high, that advertising on the whole yields a
negative net benefit to recipients. If recipients are unable to distinguish,
before processing the messages, between advertising messages that yield a
positive net benefit and those that yield negative net benefit, then they may
prefer to receive no advertising at all. Thus for media where all messages
look alike ex ante (before they are processed), and the net benefit of
processing advertising is negative, consumers will have an aversion to all
marketing on these media, which we will call "Marketing Aversion." When
Marketing Aversion exists, consumers may avoid processing all
advertising messages, if possible, or may urge policymakers to ban all
advertising.60
Indeed, if consumers cannot distinguish ex ante between advertising
and personal messages, and the net benefit to consumers of processing all
messages received (including nonadvertising messages) were negative,
then consumers would want to ignore all messages received. Thus it would
not be worthwhile to answer the telephone, or read one's mail, e-mail, or
Internet forum postings. If this occurred for most users of a medium, the
medium would collapse as a means of communicating with others, which
we will call 'Medium Failure." Direct marketing thus can affect the
viability of a medium.
6 1
If the net benefit to all senders and recipients of all marketing
messages is negative, then there is "Negative Welfare from Marketing." If
it proves impossible to reduce the harms from marketing or to block just
the welfare-reducing marketing messages, then the government may want
60. In this case marketers using low response rate lists to send WRM impose a negative
externality not just on receivers, but also on other marketers that are targeting more
carefully, since recipients might equally ignore all advertising.
61. There are likely a number of media that have collapsed because of this problem,
especially on the Internet, which has extremely low message sending costs. For example,
many unmonitored Usenet groups and Internet forums have disappeared. See Molly Wood,
Eulogy for Usenet, ZDNET.coM, Jan 25, 2005, http://reviews-zdnet.com.com/4520-
6033_16-5622511-1.html ("After all, the AOL hordes, by many accounts, ushered in the
decline of Usenet, including the arrival of the span that would eventually overwhelm the
neighborhood."); see also John C. Dvorak, Googlepedia: The End is Near, PCMAG.COM.,
Feb. 14, 2005, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1895,1764757,00.asp ("Usenet has fallen
out of favor and been largely marginalized over the past several years, as spammers helped
ruin it.").
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to consider banning all unsolicited direct marketing on this medium. Note
that direct marketing may, as a whole, provide positive net benefits to
society even if consumers have Marketing Aversion, if the profits to firms
(plus any external benefits) 62 outweigh the costs to consumers from the
marketing.
63
A. The Mathematical Model
This Part outlines the mathematical model that demonstrates the
conditions for when some or all firms' direct marketing will be welfare-
reducing.64 Readers who are not interested in the mathematics may skip
this Subsection. Let the firm's cost of sending an advertising message to
each consumer be s for a particular communications medium. The price it
charges for the good is P, and the cost of producing and shipping the good,
excluding advertising costs, is C. The firm sends messages to each list for
which the expected revenue from responses exceeds the sending costs. The
expected economic profit per message sent to a person on list i is
(Eq. 1): 1. = (P - C) 8i - s where 8i is the response rate for list i.
The firm sends advertising to all lists for which r, > 0, and therefore all
lists with response rate 0 > s/(P - C). The list with the lowest response rate
em to be contacted is then
62. One external benefit might be financial support for providing the medium. For
example, the U.S. Postal Service relies significantly on direct marketing for revenues. Thus
a ban on direct mail would likely force postal rates up for noncommercial users. Similarly,
some broadcast media (which do not involve direct marketing) likely have the equivalent of
Marketing Aversion, but most consumers accept the advertising messages to be a necessary
evil, since the messages support the other uses of the medium. For example, programming
on advertiser-supported television and radio broadcasts is supported by consumers having to
view advertisements during the programs.
63. Whether policymakers want to include sellers' profits in the analysis depends on
whether they prefer to focus on total social welfare or on consumer surplus. Economic
theory has traditionally assumed that side payments between economic actors and groups
can be arranged, such that winners (those that gain from a policy) can compensate losers for
their losses. Thus, social welfare analysis usually has the goal of choosing the policy that
maximizes the total gain to society as a whole, and assumes that the gains can be
redistributed as necessary to make everyone happy. If such side payments are not feasible,
then policymakers must choose how to weigh the various parties' gains and losses
according to political tastes and, possibly, considerations of long-term dynamic implications
(e.g., economic growth and technological development).
64. This model was first outlined in Shiman, supra note 51, and further developed in
Daniel R. Shiman, The Impact of Firms' Increased Information about Consumers on the
Volume and Targeting of Direct Marketing (Aug. 1997) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=555646 (scroll down to SSRN Electronic Paper
Collection and download).
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(Eq. 2): Om = s/(P - C).
As s falls, lists with lower response rates will get advertising.
Meanwhile, consumers who receive messages incur a cost r for
processing each message. Assume that those consumers that choose to buy
the good value it at B, if they are offered it, such that they receive value of
B - P if they buy it.65 The ex ante expected utility or benefit to consumers
of receiving each message, often called the consumer surplus, is the
probability of buying the good multiplied by the benefit if purchased,• • •66
minus the receiving cost. So if consumers on list i have probability ei of
buying the good, let their expected utility from each advertising message
be
(Eq. 3): uia = (B - P)0i - r.
The social welfare gained from each message is the sum of the
expected benefits to senders and receivers, plus any external costs or
benefits to third parties. 67 Assume that the external cost or benefit to third
parties, call it E, is constant for each message. 68 Then the social welfare
65. We assume that consumers have a linear additively separable utility function such
that for each message received, their ex post utility is
u= (B-P)-r ifB>P
-r if B < P.
Note that the cost of receiving messages rises linearly with the number of messages such
that twice as many messages are considered twice as burdensome to consumers. This may
understate the actual increase in cost if consumers feel there is an annoyance factor to
receiving more advertising messages, particularly for messages advertising goods that are
not purchased.
66. Note that we assume that the receiver benefits from the message only if he or she
buys the good advertised. Some consumers may benefit from seeing advertised prices for
competing goods from multiple prices, even if they intend to purchase just one good. Or
they may enjoy "window shopping" by browsing catalogs, either because they have an
interest in the products or in the manner of presentation (such as Sharper Image). These
benefits gained from just receiving the message can be incorporated into the analysis either
by adjusting the receiving cost r, if all messages are of interest or if only some messages are
of interest, by assuming that B incorporates the utility from consuming both the message
and the good. In the latter case, not all positive benefits B > P lead to a purchase, and
consumers may actually want more mail than they receive. The market solution to this latter
case is simple: the advertiser may require payment for its advertising if no purchases are
made, as some catalog companies have appeared to do by putting a price on the catalog.
67. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 54, ch. 3. We assume for simplicity there are
no taxes.
68. E could represent the impact of an advertising letter or catalog on a landfill, or the
burden on an ISP of passing along an e-mail in which case the value of E would be
negative. Note that whether a message is responded to will not likely change the message's
impact on the environment and on message intermediaries, so its cost or benefit does not
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gained from each message sent to list i would be
(Eq. 4): Wi + i + Ua E
= [(P - C)0i - s] + [(B - P)0i - r] + E
= (B - C)Ai - s - r + E.
A message is welfare reducing if Wi < 0. Observe that iq can be positive,
while ui a and even Wi can be negative if r, P, and E are large enough.
69
This means that the firm may find it profitable to send messages to some
consumers while those consumers and society, including third parties, gain
negative benefit from receiving the messages. This is because r and E are
externalities, which are costs to consumers and society that are not directly
paid for by producers and buyers during the transaction. To simplify the
analysis for now, E will be assumed to be zero. From (Eq. 2), (Eq. 4), and
the fact that W, is increasing in Oi in (Eq. 4), we find70 that WRM messages
will be sent, meaning that Wi < 0 for some lists i, only if
(Eq. 5): s/(P - C) < r/(B - P).
For this analysis it is assumed that B, P, and C are constant. While
they will vary among products, firms, and consumers, it seems unlikely
that they will vary much by medium for any given product, and therefore
the focus is on how changes in receiving cost r and sending cost s,
especially large order-of-magnitude changes, affect social welfare.
Consequently, WRM messages are more likely to be sent in media with
low sending costs and high receiving costs. Consumers will not want to
receive any WRM messages since for those messages Uia < 0.
If all advertising messages look alike ex ante, it is possible for the
negative utility obtained by consumers for those messages to outweigh the
positive benefits from other advertising messages received. Thus, summing
the utilities for all advertising messages j received by a consumer, if
(Eq. 6): 1juja < 0
then there is Marketing Aversion.
vary with 0j. E could also be positive. For example, the pictures of missing children placed
on some advertising mail may aid in their return.
69. Here E is assumed to be negative and "large" in absolute value terms.
70. See Shiman, supra note 51, at 39.
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. Medium Failure occurs when receivers are unable to distinguish ex
ante between advertising and personal messages, and the net benefit of
receiving all messages is negative. If consumers receive personal
messages, each yielding utility ul, then they will ignore all messages
received if the messages all look alike ex ante, and if
(Eq. 7): Ijuja + FkUkp < 0.
Negative Welfare from Marketing occurs when the net benefit to
society, including senders and receivers, of all marketing messages is
negative. Thus summing the welfare, Wi, gained from each message over
all lists i and all people m, on each list, direct marketing in a particular
medium is generally harmful to society if total social welfare ("SW") is
negative, or
(Eq. 8): SW = XY.mWi = Ymi [(B - C)0 - s - r + E] < 0.
B. An Example of Welfare-Reducing Marketing
A simple example will illustrate how the value of direct marketing
can vary by communications medium. Assume that a firm wants to
advertise its good using direct marketing. The firm has three lists of
consumers with a different response rate, or the percentage of people on
the list that purchase the good, for each list. Let the high, medium, and low
response rate Lists be H, M, and L, respectively, with corresponding
response rates OH = 25%, 0 M = 5%, and 0L = 1%. For this example, assume
that the cost of producing and shipping the good is C = $20, exclusive of
advertising expense, and the price that it sets is P = $30, yielding a profit
per good sold, excluding advertising costs, also known as the "allowable
margin" or "net order contribution," of P - C = $10 per unit sold.
Meanwhile, consumers who receive messages incur a cost for processing
the message r, which is assumed to be $0.25. Also assume that those
consumers who choose to buy the good value it at B = $32. Thus, they
receive value of B - P = $2 if they buy it.
We can see what happens when the sending cost s falls, from $2 to
$0.40 to $0.01, as marketers switch to lower cost media or as
communications costs fall within a medium. The payoffs received per
message, by firms, consumers, and society, are shown in Table 1 for Media
1, 2, and 3. (See infra Table 1.)
So for Medium 1 and List H in Table 1, there is a 25% probability
that each message will result in a sale for the firm, which combined with a
$10 allowable margin per sale, generates $2.50 expected (average) revenue
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per message. After subtracting out the $2 cost of a message, this yields a
net expected profit, it, per message of $0.50. Meanwhile, consumers on
List H have a probability of 25% of receiving a benefit of $2 from buying
the good, for an expected benefit of $0.50 of hearing about the good, which
with a cost of the equivalent of $0.25 in effort to process each message,
yields a net expected benefit of $0.25 per message. Expected social welfare
gained by society is then the $0.50 benefit (profit) to firms plus the $0.25
benefit (i.e., consumer surplus or "CS") to consumers, or $0.75 for each
message sent. It is assumed here that there are no costs or benefits to
message intermediaries or the environment. If there were such, the
estimated social welfare would be adjusted accordingly.
In Medium 1, because of the high sending cost, it is only profitable
for a firm to send messages to List H. Meanwhile, Medium 2's lower
sending cost makes it profitable to also contact List M, and in Medium 3,
List L is contacted as well. Although the mailing to List H generates
positive benefits to consumers and society in every medium, the mailing to
list List M in Medium 2 yields negative consumer surplus and social
welfare, and therefore, those messages are WRM messages. Consumers
and society would be better off without this mailing.
In Medium 3 there is not just WRM for List L. If a consumer does not
know which list he or she is on, and has equal probability of being on each
list,71 then the expected benefit of receiving a message is -$0.04 per
message7 2 such that the cost to the consumer of receiving all unsolicited
advertising outweighs the benefit of hearing about the products offered.
The consumer would then prefer to receive no advertising, and there would
be Marketing Aversion. Medium 3 would be a candidate for Medium
Failure if consumers were equally likely to be on Lists H, M, and L,73 and
the gain from getting personal messages was less than the loss from
receiving advertising messages.
Medium 4 demonstrates how an increase in the receivers' cost of
processing messages can affect their attitude towards direct marketing. The
rise in receiving cost relative to Medium 1 now makes receivers much
worse off.74 And even though messages are better targeted in Medium 4,
71. Note that not knowing which list you are on means not knowing how the product's
attributes relate to your personal characteristics, rendering you unable to determine your
likelihood of purchase before processing the message and learning about the product.
72. See infra Table 1, rightmost column.
73. In fact, since direct marketing is usually used for niche-type goods, consumers are
much more likely to be on lists with low response rates such as L and M. With a higher
probability of being on List M and especially L, the average consumer benefit from
receiving unsolicited advertising will be even lower for Media 2 and 3.
74. A rise in receiving costs can occur for a number of reasons, such as an increase in
the value of a receiver's time, or the use of new media in which immediate processing of a
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receivers in that medium are worse off there than in Medium 2. Thus, the
extent of the volume problem depends on the combination of r and s for a
particular medium. Observe also that a ban on all advertising messages sent
would increase social welfare in Medium 4 since that medium has
Negative Welfare from Marketing. However, even though consumers may
advocate a ban in Medium 3, such a ban would not be welfare maximizing.
IV. APPLYING THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
A rough determination of which media are more likely to have WRM
messages and Marketing Aversion can be made by examining the
estimated sending and receiving costs for each medium. The results for a
variety of media, using roughly estimated sending and receiving costs, are
graphically displayed in Figure 2. Direct marketing messages from media
that are characterized by both high receiving costs, such that the messages
are costly for consumers to process, and low sending costs, such that the
messages are more poorly targeted, will be less desirable to receivers.
Hence, in the diagram, consumers should prefer advertising from media in
the lower left, while media that are in the upper right are more likely to
have WRM, Marketing Aversion, and Medium Failure. (See infra Figure
2.)
This diagram demonstrates why some media have been regulated
more quickly and heavily than others, particularly among older media.
Despite complaints about the increased volume of direct mail received,
mail's characteristics probably give it the highest value of consumer
surplus, which helps explain why it has remained unregulated.
Telemarketing's higher receiving cost has led to increasing regulation,
while fax advertising's combination of low sending costs and high
receiving costs is probably the reason why it was quickly banned.
It is also clear from the diagram that the problems of WRM,
Marketing Aversion, Medium Failure, and Negative Welfare from
Marketing are potentially far more serious for the newer communications
message is needed, such as for a cell phone. These examples also demonstrate how
technological changes can improve the situation. Changes that lower the cost of receiving
messages (i.e., going from Medium 4 to Medium 1) will increase receivers' net benefits
from direct marketing.
75. While estimates can be easily developed for sending costs, estimating receiving
costs for the average recipient is much more difficult. It was assumed here that receiving
costs depend on how long it takes to process a message (e.g., e-mail can be quickly scanned
and discarded), whether a message demands immediate attention or not (e.g., phone calls
and messages to mobile devices are usually attended to quickly), whether there is a cost
charged for receiving a message (e.g., wireless calls use up minutes of a plan; senders and
receivers pay for each SMS message), and whether the receiver's physical resources are
used (e.g., faxes consume paper and ink).
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media, compared to the traditional media of mail and wireline calls. The
use of electronic communications and the Internet has significantly
lowered the cost of sending out messages, often by several orders of
magnitude. Meanwhile, the use of personal mobile devices to allow
consumers to communicate whenever they want, no matter what they are
doing, and to immediately send and receive important messages, has
increased the disruption caused by receiving low value messages. Thus,
the problems caused by direct marketing are likely to be quite significant
for calls and text messages to wireless phones and for e-mail and instant
messaging on the Internet. This helps explain why there has been an
increased interest by the public and policymakers in regulating direct
marketing, and why the option of banning direct marketing for particular
media is increasingly discussed.
77
The potential for trouble would appear to be greatest for personal
wireless devices if e-mail from the Internet is allowed to reach wireless
phones as SMS text messages. With near-zero costs of sending, and a
significant disruption caused to recipients, the potential harm caused by
direct marketing here is very large.79 The FCC has imposed a ban on
sending unsolicited commercial messages to the Internet e-mail addresses
for wireless devices.
80
V. THE IMPACT OF OTHER FACTORS ON THE ANALYSIS
While overall sending and receiving costs are key determinants of the
existence and extent of WRM and Marketing Aversion, other factors, such
as how individuals vary in their preferences for direct marketing, the
impact of direct marketing on the environment and on message
intermediaries, changes in technology and receivers' value of time, the
impact of the recent increase in volume of direct marketing received, and
the existence of alternative direct marketing channels, also play a
significant role. This Article discusses here how policymakers could take
these factors into consideration when considering what kind of regulations,
if any, are needed to regulate direct marketing within a particular medium.
76. This, and the fact that the consumers pay for minutes of use, explains why many
people do not want to have their cell phone numbers published. See CBSNews.com, supra
note 15.
77. See Part II.A, supra.
78. While in Europe such a connection has not been enabled, some U.S. carriers are
starting to provide a gateway between Internet e-mail and SMS text messages. In Japan,
DoCoMo already blocks as spam about 80% of the one billion e-mails it receives from the
Internet for its SMS customers. Guerra, supra note 12.
79. Guerra, supra note 12.
80. Non-Solicited Pornography, supra note 28, at 15927, para. 1.
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A. Variation by Individual in Direct Marketing's Impact
Individual characteristics of consumers play a crucial role since
consumers are heterogeneous in the direct marketing they will receive and
their reaction to it. Consumers will vary in two key dimensions. First, the
receiving cost will vary by individual. Some people place a higher value on
their time or find intrusions on some media more irritating. Others,
however, may like the convenience of being directly notified of available
products through direct marketing or may enjoy looking through catalogs
even if they don't buy. Second, people with certain characteristics may be
more likely to be targeted by direct marketers. Mailing lists of consumers
who make frequent purchases, have high incomes, or have recently had a
baby are considered particularly valuable, and these consumers generally
get more direct advertising. 8 1 Some consumers might even find themselves
placed on inappropriate mailing lists. One person complained that buying a
baby gift for someone else put her on a mailing list for parents, and she was
subsequently inundated by advertisements for baby products.82 To the
extent that consumers are heterogeneous in their reaction to direct
advertising, policymakers may want to give consumers the choice of not
receiving direct advertising.
B. Variation in Impact According to the Source and Type of Direct
Marketing
Some sources and types of direct marketing may provide less
irritation than others, even if the response rates are similar. For example,
consumers may not mind receiving direct marketing from firms of which
they are currently customers. Surveys show that consumers are much more
likely to read mail from firms with which they have had a past
relationship.83 In addition, many consumers benefit from receiving and
perusing catalogs, even if they make no purchase. They may enjoy keeping
up with fashions and technology. They may also find their ability to get the
lowest price improves with the receipt of multiple catalogs. Low response
81. Oversight Hearing, supra note 21. Important and famous people also tend to
receive a large volume of unsolicited personal messages and "fan mail," creating a similar
kind of burden, similar because the sender imposes a cost on the receiver of processing the
unsolicited message. Id.
82. Oversight Hearing, supra note 21.
83. Jean Li Rogers, Mail Advertising and Consumer Behavior, 13 PSYCH. & MKTG,
211, 224-25 (1996); See HOUSEHOLD DIARY STUDY 1999, supra note 17, at VI-59. This
effect falls outside the framework described above only if it is not the result of house lists
having higher response rates. Note that solicited direct marketing messages are excluded
from this Article's analysis.
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rates for these kinds of advertising might be misleading as to their value to
consumers.
C. Impact on Third Parties
A full economic analysis of the problem should take into account not
only the impact on consumers and firms of direct marketing, but also other
externalities as well. First, direct mail and fax advertising may have an
impact on the environment from the disposal of unwanted messages. Direct
mail in particular has provoked complaints about the large quantity of solid
waste created, and the burden on land fills it creates. 84 In response, the
U.S. Postal Service initiated a "Greening the Mail" Task Force to study
methods of reducing environmental waste and improving recycling of mail,
and about half of all direct mail marketers reported using recycled paper in
their promotions.
85
Second, unsolicited advertising may have an impact on message
intermediaries that have to deliver the messages. These intermediaries may
find it harmful or beneficial to transmit the advertising messages,
depending on the cost of handling the message and whether they receive
compensation for passing it along. Telephone companies and the U.S.
Postal Service receive payment for transmitting advertising and encourage
it with volume discounts, as do TV and radio stations, which depend on
advertising for their revenue. 86 ISPs, on the other hand, receive no payment
for messages sent or received, and unsolicited commercial e-mail has
become a significant burden on their systems.
8 7
D. Impact of Economic and Technological Factors on Sending and
Receiving Costs
Economic and technological factors can have a significant impact on
sending and receiving costs, and therefore on whether direct marketing
should be regulated for a particular medium. The development of new
electronic media for communication is the most obvious factor to take into
consideration. These media usually have much lower sending costs, which
84. DIRECT MKTG. ASS'N, supra note 25, at 57.
85. Id. at 55-58.
86. For example, the U.S. Postal Service offers discounts for large quantities of
advertising mail, with additional discounts depending on the size and weight of the mail and
whether it is presorted. USPS Web site, http:llpe.usps.comltextldmn300/
243.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). See also HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRY ECONOMICS, ch. 6 (4th ed., 1998).
87. Barry D. Bowen, Controlling Unsolicited Bulk E-Mail: Who's Taking Action?
What's Being Done?, SUNWORLD, Aug. 1997, http://sunsite.uakom.sk/sunworldonline/
swol-08-1997/swol-08-junkemail.html.
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increases the likely volume of poorly-targeted direct marketing received.
In some cases, the cost of sending has dropped by several orders of
magnitude.
88
Receiving costs have also been affected by economic and
technological factors. Time appears to have become an increasingly
valuable commodity to consumers, so the cost of processing a message in a
particular medium may be increasing. In addition, as people develop busy
schedules, the ability to avoid or postpone handling low priority messages
becomes more important and raises the cost of messages on media that
require immediate handling, such as phone calls. 89 Meanwhile, new
technological advances have not just lowered sending costs, but receiving
costs as well. The use of answering machines, voice mail, caller ID, and
anonymous call rejection have lowered the receiving cost of telemarketing
calls, just as spam filters have lowered the cost to receivers from e-mail
advertising. In addition, it is important to recognize that the development
of electronic messaging has not only lowered the cost of sending a message
in comparison to phone calls, but also made it easier for receivers to scan
the subject and contents of the message, and to delay processing the
message until it is convenient.
E. Impact of Changes in Volume and Targeting in Traditional
Channels
Recently, the volume of direct mail and telemarketing calls has
dramatically increased, as discussed above and seen in Figure 1. The
reasons for this include a decline in sending costs, (especially in
telemarketing) and businesses' increased demand for advertising. 90 The
development of geodemographic and psychographic databases, with their
extensive information about individual consumers, has also played a major
factor in direct marketing's growth. 91 The use of these databases has
helped direct marketers to better identify likely buyers and has increased
the volume of direct marketing sent to these buyers.
88. See Figure 2, infra.
89. These factors may help explain the recent push to help consumers avoid
telemarketing calls.
90. Shiman, supra note 1. See also DICK SHAVER, THE NEXT STEP IN DATABASE
MARKETING: CONSUMER GUIDED MARKETING 228-29 (1996).
91. SHAVER, supra note 90, at 229-30; Shiman, supra note 1.
92. SHAVER, supra note 90, at 228-31; see Shiman, supra note 1. The explanation for
why better targeting increases the volume of direct marketing, which might seem
counterintuitive if it is expected that it eliminates mailings to likely nonbuyers, is that
increased information makes it profitable to conduct mailings that were hitherto
unprofitable. For example, a firm might not find it profitable to advertise encyclopedias in a
mailing to the whole population because of the low response rate, but might find it
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The growth of direct marketing in traditional channels has drawn the
attention of the public and the media and spurred adoption of a national do-
not-call list. Yet, whether consumers are actually made worse off by this
growth depends on the cause of the increase. To the extent that use of these
databases helps improve the targeting of direct marketing, consumers may
be better off because more of their mail and telemarketing calls will be
useful, and they will receive fewer offers they do not want. However, the
increase in volume may make consumers worse off, for two reasons. First,
if lists with lower response rates are being used (due to a fall in sending
costs), WRM is more likely, as already discussed. Second, the marginal
benefit of receiving each additional message is likely to fall as more
messages are received for competing products. The first credit card offer
may be considered valuable, but the tenth such offer will probably be of
little marginal value, since it is unlikely to be offering significantly higher
benefits than earlier messages. On the other hand, for some products, more
competing offers should mean increased competition and lower prices.
93
F. Viewing Communications Media as Alternative Marketing
Channels
Rather than independently examining each medium to determine the
extent of WRM on that medium, one could instead view all of the media
available as just alternative means of delivering the same advertising
message to consumers. If all consumers were identical, and available media
only differed in their sending and receiving costs, then the problem can be
defined for policymakers as finding the optimal medium in which to allow
direct marketing to be distributed, while banning unsolicited advertising on
all other channels, on which advertising would be redundant. However,
since consumers are heterogeneous in their tastes and in the attention they
pay to different media, and because of strong legal concerns about limiting
free speech, policymakers are unlikely to fully adopt this viewpoint. Yet,
this approach could play an important part in the evaluation of the problem
of WRM in various media and the appropriateness of different solutions
under consideration.
worthwhile to do a direct mailing to a list of parents of school-age children. A theoretical
demonstration and analysis of this effect is provided in Shiman, supra note 64.
93. For example, competition between multiple credit card companies to gain
customers might cause them to lower the price of obtaining a credit card. Thus the
annoyance to consumers of getting more direct marketing could be outweighed by the drop
in prices from the increase in competition.
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VI. AVAILABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
In addition to the basic conditions described above, the extent and
seriousness of WRM observed in a medium depends as well on the
technological, organizational, and physical solutions that are available for
dealing with the problem. A variety of innovative methods have been used
to solve the problems of WRM messages and Marketing Aversion. This
Article, discusses, in turn, those solutions that receivers can adopt for
themselves, those that can be adopted by advertisers singly or through an
industry association, and those that government (or if it exists, an
organization or message intermediary that controls message sending on a
particular medium) can impose. Many of these solutions have been
discussed in the literature on direct marketing.
94
A typology of the major types of solutions that have been used is
presented in Table 2. While not a comprehensive list, most solutions
employed fit into one of these types. These solutions generally have a goal
of either eliminating poorly targeted advertising messages, reducing the
cost of processing messages, or giving consumers the ability to avoid
receiving some or all advertising. (See infra Table 2.)
A. Receiver-Deployed Solutions
Many consumers have found ways to scan messages, in order to
determine their value quickly, instead of processing them fully.95 Scanning
includes checking the source of the message (e.g., from the envelope, the
"From:" field on an e-mail, or Caller ID), skimming the message, or using
an answering machine to screen calls. While these methods generally lower
the cost of processing messages, they increase the likelihood of missing
potentially valuable offers or important messages that are accidentally
filtered out. Scanning is made easier for consumers when advertising is
well labeled, so government-imposed labeling requirements can be
beneficial.
Another method used to handle WRM is to have someone screen
incoming messages. Screening can be costly, and is employed, for instance,
by people whose high value of time justifies paying a receptionist to
answer telephone calls and read the mail. On the Internet, many forums are
moderated, meaning someone has volunteered to screen out undesirable
94. See, e.g., Ayres & Funk, supra note 47; Cranor & LaMacchia, supra note 47;
Goodwin, supra note 41; Milne & Gordon, supra note 45; Nadel, supra note 47.
95. According to a 1998 survey, only 12.4% of households usually read their
advertising mail, while 38.8% usually scan it, 37.2% read some of it, and 11.5% usually do
not read it. Household Diary Study 1999, supra note 17, at Im-27.
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messages. 96 This often involves a significant investment of time by the
moderator.97 Filtering, which is similar, involves automatically rejecting
messages depending on their type or source. E-mail, for example, can be
filtered by software.
-gs
Limiting access can be implemented either by individual receivers,
who can decide to receive messages only from people they know, or by a
central decision maker who restricts communications to the group to those
sent by approved members. Many Internet forums try to restrict marketers'
access to the group by limiting discussion to members. 99 Some early users
of Internet forums formed small private groups to continue their
discussions uninterrupted by low-quality commercial and noncommercial
messages. 100
B. Industry-Deployed Solutions
A variety of solutions can be deployed by direct marketers that reduce
the problem of WRM. Voluntary restraints are often recommended by
industry groups and adopted by firms to forestall government regulation, to
avoid offending potential customers, and to avert retaliation by unhappy
recipients. For example, business is supposed to learn the proper
"netiquette" for advertising on the Internet. Firms have been advised to
avoid being obtrusive, to learn about and be respectful of the culture of the
Internet, to tailor their messages to their audience, and to use more
interactive methods of advertising. 10 2 Offended consumers can quickly
spread the word about a company's transgressions, 10 3 which makes large
96. See RESNICK & TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 16.
97. One academic listserv group's moderator, who normally does not filter out postings
from subscribers, said he receives "many requests to post advertisements for new lists, new
servers, new journals, old journals, dozens of conferences, and on and on. If I forward them
all, you would want to unsubscribe." Posting of Samuel H. Williamson, Executive Director,
The Cliometric Society, Miami University, SWILLIAM@sba-laws.sba.muohio.edu, to
econhist@cs.muohio.edu (Nov. 30, 1994) (on file with Author and FCLJ).
98. Microsoft Outlook and many antivirus and firewall software packages now provide
filters that attempt to remove UCE.
99. Chao, supra note 11. Of course, for large public Internet forums, it can be difficult
to identify marketers or people who have engaged in inappropriate marketing in the past and
should be excluded because of the anonymity of the Internet. It is usually quite easy to
create a new identity in these forums without divulging personal information.
100. Id.
101. See Raj Mehta & Eugene Sivadas, Direct Marketing on the Internet: An Empirical
Assessment of Consumer Attitudes, J. DIRECT MKTG., Summer 1995, at 21, 22; RESNICK &
TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 152-55; MARY J. CRONIN, DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET:
How THE ELECTRONIC HIGHWAY is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN COMPANIES (1994).
102. See Mehta & Sivadas, supra note 101, at 22-24.
103. For example, one entrepreneur tried to market beauty cream to a business librarian
newsgroup on the Internet, and later apologized to the group for the intrusion when he
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companies in particular very careful in how they market on the Internet,
since they have more to lose from offending current customers than to gain
by adding a few new ones.104
Many firms maintain their own in-house "do-not-contact" lists.
10 5
Some firms put check-off boxes on their mailings, order forms, and Web
sites that allow their customers to indicate that they do not want any
advertising from the firm, and that they do not want their name shared with
others. Telemarketers are required by law to maintain lists of consumers
who ask for no further calls from the telemarketer. 106 This solution,
sometimes called an "opt-out option" or "negative option," allows
consumers to designate more specifically the advertising they do not want,
thus reducing the burden that WRM places on consumers.107
Industry "do-not-contact" lists, which allow consumers to opt out of
receiving all advertising, are the solution offered by the DMA. 108 For
example, there is a Mail Preference Service ("MPS"), which maintains a
"do-not-write" list of people who have requested that they not receive any
unsolicited direct mail. All marketers are expected to refrain from
sending direct mail to people on this list. °10 Similarly, the Telephone
Preference Service ("TPS") and the E-mail Preference Service ("e-MPS")
maintain "do-not-call" and "do-not-email" lists. The DMA requires that all
members honor these lists." ' This solution is particularly appropriate when
consumers differ in their reaction to direct marketing, such that some have
Marketing Aversion, while others want to receive some advertising.
Offering inducements or rewards to process messages, such as
coupons, prizes or lottery drawings, is a method some firms use to
effectively lower the consumer's cost of processing the message. It also
increases the consumer's likelihood of not discarding the message when
scanning it.
received a flurry of angry messages instead of orders. MARY J. CRONIN, DOING BusiNEss ON
THE INTERNET: How THE ELECTRONIC HIGHWAY IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN COMPANIES
117(1994).
104. See Mehta & Sivadas, supra note 101, at 24; Bowen, supra note 87. Unfortunately,
there are small firms that care little about their reputation and are willing to offend many
consumers in their hunt for a few buyers. Because of the very low cost of sending e-mail
messages, even a small number of such firms can create a significant problem with spam.
105. Goodwin, supra note 41, at 104.
106. 47 U.S.C. § 207(c)(3) (2000).
107. See Jeff Sovem, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control
of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1069-82, 1092-94 (1999).
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Voluntary restraints may not be successful in media to which many
firms have open access. Too many firms sending out poorly-targeted
messages can lead to widespread Marketing Aversion and even to Medium
Failure, in which consumers stop paying attention to the medium. In this
case no single firm bears the full cost of sending out too many messages,
thus leading to a free-rider problem where each firm has inadequate
incentive to reduce its own message sending, despite the benefit if all do
so. Consumer enforcement of rules may also be ineffective. For example,
netiquette has often been enforced by users themselves, who have "flamed"
or sent rude messages back at those who break the understood rules of the
Internet. 112 Yet, some aggressive marketers are willing to brave this "flame
war," if it is profitable. According to one marketer, a typical mailing is
sent out to about 250,000 addresses at a time and yields a 0.5% positive
response rate, with flames trashed automatically. 113 Voluntary self-
regulation will be effective only if four conditions hold: (1) the regulations
are strong enough to solve the problem for consumers; (2) existing firms
agree to the regulations; (3) entry into the industry is difficult for small
unscrupulous firms that ignore the regulations; and (4) those abuses that do
occur are not very costly to consumers.
C. Solutions Imposed by a Government, Message Intermediary, or
Controlling Organization
In some media there is a controlling organization (that controls the
content of the messages sent) or a message intermediary, (which carries
messages but does not generally decide on content), which has an
incentive to reduce WRM and avoid Medium Failure, especially if its
income depends on consumers paying attention to the messages received,
or if transmitting the messages is costly and unprofitable.1 4 In other media
government regulation may be the only way to reduce or eliminate WRM
and avoid Medium Failure. In addition to making opt-out programs, (such
as the FTC's Do Not Call Registry), and labeling requirements mandatory,
government, message intermediaries, and controlling organizations have
other methods available for reducing the problem of WRM.
112. See Milne & Gordon, supra note 45, at 209.
113. Bowen, supra note 87.
114. For example, television and radio stations are controlling organizations that limit
the amount of advertising they broadcast in order to avoid driving viewers away. Too much
advertising leads to the equivalent of Medium Failure in which consumers stop paying
attention to the medium by changing the channel. ISPs attempt to eliminate sparn, partly
because of the cost of carrying it and also because of their customers' dislike for it. Bowen,
supra note 87.
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Charging a fee or tax for sending messages is one method of reducing
WRM. With higher message-sending costs, senders will have an incentive
to use only lists with high response rates. Since senders already know the
message, it might be socially desirable and economically efficient to make
them determine for whom the message will be valuable. 1 1 5 The socially
optimal fee was derived in Shiman, When E-Mail Becomes Junk Mail.
1 16
One variant of this solution that has recently gained popularity in the
scholarly press would require senders of unsolicited advertising to offer to
pay receivers to receive messages, at a price to be set by the receiver. 11 7 It
has been argued that this will achieve the optimal level of message sending
and eliminate the negative externality that unsolicited messages impose on
receivers.118
To reduce the intrusiveness and receiving cost of some messages,
limitations are often placed on how and when messages are sent.
Restrictions have been placed on telemarketers to prohibit calling late at
115. Similarly, low-quality messages can often be discouraged by charging a fee, as
some refereed journals do for submitted papers and college admissions offices do for
applications.
116. Shiman, supra note 51, at 39.
117. See, e.g., BILL GATEs ET AL., THE ROAD AHEAD 173-74 (1995); Ayres & Funk,
supra note 47, at 80-81.
118. See, e.g., Ayres & Funk, supra note 47, at 80-81; Loder, Van Alstyne & Wash,
supra note 47, 6-8. Since senders have to pay for the processing costs they impose on
receivers, this proposal effectively internalizes the externality, and the higher sending costs
induce senders to better target their messages to consumers who are likely to purchase the
good. However, a potential problem with this proposal that is not addressed by advocates is
that many receivers may attempt to game this system in order to maximize the revenue
gained from senders. Receivers interested in increasing their income may want to
misrepresent their likelihood of purchasing to try to increase the messages they get paid for
receiving. Thus, many consumers will want to provide false information about their
characteristics to surveys and questionnaires to make themselves look likely to purchase
expensive goods. For example, a low-income respondent could describe herself as a wealthy
boat owner in order to attract and be paid for receiving direct marketing messages
attempting to sell boats or accessories. This could cause significant problems for poll-takers,
market researchers, and the Census, for whom it is essential that respondents have no
financial interest in providing untruthful answers. Note that proposals that require
consumers to read the messages before being paid could be foiled by software that pretends
to read the message. For an example of proposals that require consumers to read messages
before being paid, see GATES ET AL., supra note 117, at 173-74. Alternative schemes of
charging senders can be devised that avoid this incentive for misrepresentation, but they
would not likely achieve the optimal level of message sending. For example, consumers
could be allowed to set their price for receiving a message, but would only be compensated
if they purchase the good. They would not then want to attract messages for goods they
would not buy, and the higher price set by some receivers would discourage senders from
sending messages to them. Alternatively, the senders' payments could go to another entity
(e.g., the carrier providing the communications service) rather than the receiver. The higher
sending costs would induce senders to better target their messages, and receivers would not
have an incentive to attract messages for goods they are unlikely to buy.
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night, to prevent the tying up of emergency police and ambulance lines,
and to stop telemarketing equipment holding on to the line after the
recipient has hung up.119
Government or a message intermediary may decide to implement a
total ban on unsolicited advertising, such as was imposed by the
government on unsolicited fax advertising.' 20 Such a policy would be
desirable if there is Negative Welfare from Marketing. For example, in
Table 1 a ban on all advertising would be beneficial to society in Medium
4. A policy banning the sending of advertising unless consumers grant
permission is sometimes called "opt-in." The Internet has had a culturally-
understood ban on bulk mailings of UCE, with ISPs attempting to enforce
the ban through "acceptable use" policies that users are required to abide
by. 12 1 Once detected, bulk e-mailers usually have had their access to the
Internet revoked by their ISP; however, they have been able to regain
access through ISPs that are less vigilant or more cooperative, or by use of
subterfuge. 22 Unregulated media suffering from WRM, Marketing
Aversion, or Medium Failure might, however, evolve into controlled
media, which are controlled by a single organization and are often able to
deal more effectively with the problems caused by unsolicited advertising
(and the related problem of the broadcast of low-quality noncommercial
messages). For example, moderated forums and newsgroups have often
replaced open forums on the Internet.
123
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Policymakers should be concerned about the economic inefficiencies
and harms to privacy potentially caused by some forms of direct marketing.
But before making a decision as to whether and how direct marketing
should be regulated, policymakers should carefully assess the
characteristics of a medium, employing economic analysis such as was
used in the framework presented in this Article. This is in addition to a
careful examination of the legal and ethical considerations involved, such
as firms' right to free speech and individuals' right to privacy.
Policymakers should keep in mind five important points while performing
119. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b).
120. Id.
121. Bowen, supra note 87.
122. See Zeller, supra note 8. See Raymond B. Everett, Guerilla Warfare: A System
Administrator's Perspective on Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, testimony submitted to the
FTC Workshop on Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail (1997), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/privacy/
wkshp97/comments2/reverett.htm (stating that ISPs have very little incentive in the
marketplace to invest in technology that would prevent sparnmers from sending unsolicited
commercial e-mails via their ISPs).
123. Chao, supra note 11.
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this analysis: (1) microeconomic social welfare analysis provides a useful
framework for assessing the volume problem; (2) sending as well as
receiving costs in a particular medium should be considered, since the
former determines the degree of targeting; (3) in some media, consumers
will differ in their valuation of receiving direct marketing, and the solution
chosen should be sensitive to these differences; (4) the existence of
alternative media will affect the value of unsolicited advertising on a
particular medium to consumers and society; and (5) organizational,
economic, and technological developments may reduce or increase the
need for regulation of direct marketing.
When WRM is present, consumers and message intermediaries may
need help in managing the flow of advertising received. The most desirable
solution for consumers would be to make it easier for them to process
messages. This would lower receiving costs, and would allow consumers to
process more information about products available and thus make better
purchasing decisions. This can sometimes be achieved with relatively
unobtrusive regulations, such as requiring marketers to label the sources
and purposes of messages and banning deceptive practices. These measures
would also help consumers to prioritize processing of their messages.
Opt-out and opt-in programs give control to consumers of whether
advertising messages are sent to them. These methods are crude in the
sense that consumers cannot determine whether individual offers are worth
examining, but can be useful for many consumers when Marketing
Aversion is widespread. Opt-out programs, whether company-specific or
medium-wide, allow consumers to determine when a particular source of
advertising is yielding positive utility, although the burden is on consumers
to find out about the programs and sign up for them. They may also benefit
marketers by giving low-interest consumers, who are unlikely purchasers,
the ability to remove themselves from the mailing lists. These programs are
more effective when they are well publicized and all direct marketing firms
have to honor them, such as with the FTC's Do Not Call registry.
Many solutions can be implemented by industry, and thus
government intervention is not needed in all media with WRM. However,
voluntary restraints do not always work. 124 Whether industry can develop
effective regulations for itself is unclear since some firms will ignore
124. For example, the DMA's attempt to reduce the public's concerns about spare by
requiring marketers to obey the e-mail preference service, and include a valid means of
opting out on their solicitations, has generally been unsuccessful. See COMPLIANCE GUIDE,
supra note 24, at 14 (stating that if a member of the DMA fails to adhere to the Privacy
Promise, the DMA can take action against the company, which at most includes being
expelled from the DMA).
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voluntary guidelines. As one observer pointed out, "bad guys don't self-
regulate."
12 5
It is possible that media with open access to marketers and
widespread Marketing Aversion will be supplanted by controlled media,
with one organization controlling or monitoring content, if that
organization proves able to deal effectively with unsolicited advertising. A
competitive market for media could develop, with open and controlled
media competing for consumers' attention. In addition, new technologies
may develop to help consumers handle unsolicited advertising, (as
answering machines and Caller ID have done, and filtering software may
do).
The development of new electronic media poses a major challenge to
policymakers who desire to protect these new forms of communication for
the benefit of consumers. The significantly lower sending costs of some
media, such as e-mail and instant messaging, and the higher receiving costs
of communications using mobile devices, increases the potential burden on
consumers, and welfare lost to society, caused by direct marketing. It
should be kept in mind that if the sending costs are low enough, the
resulting flood of poorly-targeted marketing means that virtually all
recipients will place a negative value on receiving direct marketing.
Medium Failure is possible if users become deluged with direct marketing
and abandon the medium. Thus, if other solutions turn out to be ineffective,
a complete ban on direct marketing may be needed (if it is even feasible to
implement) to maintain the viability of the medium. While it is possible
that technology will reduce or eliminate the problem, the outlook is not
hopeful for e-mail and similar forms of electronic messaging. The cost of
sending messages is too low, entry is too easy and anonymous for small
firms, regulations on content and labeling are impossible to perfectly
enforce on the Internet, and spammers will likely always find a way to get
around anti-spam filters by making their messages look legitimate.126
Already spain has been found by one studyTto have cost the United States
$17 billion in 2003 from lost productivity.
Further research is needed to determine the existence and extent of
WRM and Marketing Aversion in various media, how well various
solutions ameliorate the negative externalities generated by direct
marketing, and the heterogeneity of consumer responses to direct
125. Dentino, supra note 48, at 40.
126. The Internet has two key characteristics that make controlling WRM particularly
difficult: (1) the marginal cost of sending messages is essentially zero, so bulk e-mailings
can be profitable; and (2) senders can connect easily and anonymously so that identifying
them in order to block access or prosecute them can be extremely difficult.
127. Zeller, supra note 8.
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marketing in each medium. While it may prove impossible to precisely
quantify the costs involved, particularly receiving costs, a general
assessment should be possible through the use of public opinion surveys,
rough estimations of costs involved, and analysis of the technologies
available.
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TABLE 1
Payoffs Per Message to Firms, Consumers, and Society for Direct Marketing As
Sending Costs Fall
















Lists of Consumers and Their
Associated Response Rate Averages (per
H (= 25%) M (= 5%) L (= 1%) consumer contacted)
0.50 * -1.5 -1.9 0.5
0.35 * -0.15 -0.23 0.25
1.35 * -1.65 -2.13 0.75
2.10 * 0.10 ** -0.3 1.1
0.25 * -0.15 ** -0.23 0.05
2.35 * -0.05 ** -0.53 1.15
2.49 * 0.49 * 0.09 ** 1.02
0.25 * -0.15 * -0.23 ** -0.04
2.74 * 0.34 * -0.14 ** 0.98
0.50 ** -1.5 -1.9 0.5
-1.50 * -1.9 -1.98 -1.5
-1.00 ** -3.4 -3.88 
-1
* Lists that receive a marketing message because they are profitable for marketers (n>0)
** Lists that receive welfare-reducing marketing (WRM) messages, for which SW<O.
'Assumes consumers are evenly divided among all three lists. The numbers are calculated
only for those lists contacted and are averages per message.
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TABLE 2
Types of Solutions to the Problem of Welfare-Reducing Marketing
[Vol. 58
Brief Name Description
I Scanning Receiver quickly determines source or content of
message (made easier if message is properly
labeled)
2 Screening & Filtering Messages screened by another person
(receptionist or moderator) or automatically
(filtering software)
3 Limited Access Access to the medium, group, or receiver is
restricted to approved senders only
4 Company-specific opt- Receiver can put name on list requesting no
out=F'rm Do-not- advertising from a specific firm
contact list
5 Medium opt-out= Receiver can put name on list requesting no
Industry Do-not- advertising messages on that medium
contact-list
6 Rewards Sender offers inducement for a receiver to
process message
7 Fee Sender charged for sending message
8 Restrictions on Restrictions imposed on how and when messages
sending are sent
9 Total ban or opt-in No advertising messages permitted, or allowed
only only with express permission of receiver
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FIGURE 1
Third Class Pieces of Mail Received per Person, and Inflation-Adjusted Direct Mail
Expenditures per Person, 1950-2004
350 ] .... ..
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Third class pieces per person are actual number of pieces received per year. Real direct mail
expenditures per person are in thousands of (base year 2000) dollars per person, adjusted for inflation.
Sources: Total Population for per person calculation is derived from the U.S. COUNCIL OF
ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT tbl. B-34 (2004), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/sheets/b34.xls. (1) Third Class (Standard mail) Pieces per
Person: BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT DEPT. OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 (1975), at 806; U.S. POSTAL SERV., ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL (various years) (on file with the Author); Bureau of the Census, U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years). Third Class is now called
Standard mail. Standard mail is a discounted rate reserved for bulk (large volume) advertising mail.
The USPS reported that in 2003 about 76% of advertising mail was Standard (third class) mail.
HOUSEHOLD DIARY STUDY 2004, supra note 4. (2) Real Direct Mail Expenditures per Person, deflated
using the GDP price index: Coen U.S. Advertising report, supra note 5; ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 5. The Direct Mail Expenditures were divided by the U.S. population estimates
and by the GDP implicit price deflator (with the year 2000 set to 1).
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FIGURE 2














Lower Sending Costs (s)
Placement on both axes is estimated. Placement on horizontal axis according to /s.
Sources: For receiving costs, rough estimates of relative values by medium have been used,
according to various factors, such as time it takes to process, flexibility in when to process, ability to
scan and identify the message's sender and subject, and can vary by individual. For further discussion
on receiving costs, see Part Ill, supra, text for discussion. The sending costs include both the cost of
acquiring lists of consumers' addresses and telephone numbers, and the cost of creating and sending the
message. Notes on how sending costs s and some receiving costs r were determined:
(1) Mail:
s: Approximate cost of $0.35-$0.40 per piece of doing a direct mailing of an advertisement for one
product, assuming typical format. DIECr MKTG ASS'N, STATISTICAL FACT BOOK 1995, at 262.
(2) Wireline and Wireless calls (telemarketing):
s: Range of $1-4 for outbound mail sent to consumers cost per decision-maker contact given in Stone,
supra note 58, at 338. See also DIRECT MKTG ASS'N, STATISTICAL FACT BOOK 1995, at 144 (showing
cost of $4-5 per call on its sample outbound telemarketing cost worksheet). Wireless telemarketing
would likely be more costly because of the greater difficulty in obtaining wireless phone numbers.
(3) Fax:
s: Cost of approximately $0.02-0.04 per page for a high volume broadcast fax campaign. Faxts Telysis, Inc.,
http.//www.faxbroadcasters.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2006); NBS, http://www.narabroadcastingservices.
com/Rates%5BNBS%5D.htm (last visited Mar. 30,2006)
r. Will likely include $0.02-$0.08 per page for cost of printing the fax on a laser or inkjet printer. See
CONSUMERS UNION, CONSUMER REPORTS BUYING GUIDE 137 (2006).
(4) E-mail:
s: Some advertised rates are $100 for list of three million addresses and $400 for a complete e-mail
campaign to two million addresses. Americaint, Email Marketing Campaigns, http://www.americaint.
comlemail-marketing-campaigns/email-marketing-services.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2006);
Americaint, Email Lists, http://www.americaint.com/bulk-email-listsbuy-email-lists.html (last visited
Mar. 28, 2006).
r. Includes cost of transmitting, storing, and downloading for consumer and ISPs.
(5) Internet Forums, including Usenet Groups and Listservers:
s: Very low cost of writing and posting to a group with many readers.
(6) SMS text messaging for messages sent to wireless phones:
s: The cost of sending one SMS message (SMS--SMS) to an SMS receiver (i.e., SMS to SMS) is
approximately $0.05-$0.10, based on wireless phone plans; however, monthly plans with bundles of
SMS messages included are available, which would lower the average cost to $0.01 per message. Short
Message Service, WKIXPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short(message.service (last visited Mar. 28,
2006). The cost of sending Internet e-mail to SMS Messaging users (i.e., e-mail to--SMS) is the same
as e-mail.
Number 2] REGULATION OF DIRECT MARKETING 359
r. Wireless plans usually charge $0.02-$0.10 to receive each message. Lisa W. Foderaro, Young Cell
Users Rack Up Debt, a Message at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com2005/01/09/technology/09message.html?ei=5088&en=3c2813c28094e8b0&e
x=1262926800&partner=rssnyt&pagewanted=all&position (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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